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Abstract
A homomorphic, or incremental, multiset hash function, associates a hash value to arbitrary collec-
tions of objects (with possible repetitions) in such a way that the hash of the union of two collections
is easy to compute from the hashes of the two collections themselves: it is simply their sum under a
suitable group operation. In particular, hash values of large collections can be computed incrementally
and/or in parallel. Homomorphic hashing is thus a very useful primitive with applications ranging from
database integrity verification to streaming set/multiset comparison and network coding.
Unfortunately, constructions of homomorphic hash functions in the literature are hampered by two
main drawbacks: they tend to be much longer than usual hash functions at the same security level (e.g.
to achieve a collision resistance of 2128, they are several thousand bits long, as opposed to 256 bits for
usual hash functions), and they are also quite slow.
In this paper, we introduce the Elliptic Curve Multiset Hash (ECMH), which combines a usual bit
string-valued hash function like BLAKE2 with an efficient encoding into binary elliptic curves to over-
come both difficulties. On the one hand, the size of ECMH digests is essentially optimal: 2m-bit hash
values provideO(2m) collision resistance. On the other hand, we demonstrate a highly-efficient software
implementation of ECMH, which our thorough empirical evaluation shows to be capable of processing
over 3 million set elements per second on a 4 GHz Intel Haswell machine at the 128-bit security level—
many times faster than previous practical methods.
While incremental hashing based on elliptic curves has been considered previously [1], the proposed
method was less efficient, susceptible to timing attacks, and potentially patent-encumbered [2], and no
practical implementation was demonstrated.
Keywords: homomorphic hashing, elliptic curves, efficient implementation, GLS254, PCLMULQDQ.
1 Introduction
Homomorphic hashing
A multiset is a generalization of a set in which each element has an associated integer multiplicity. Given
a possibly infinite set A, a set (resp. multiset) homomorphic hash function on A maps finite subsets of A
(resp. finitely-supported multisets on A) to fixed-length hash values, allowing incremental updates: when
new elements are added to the (multi)set, the hash value of the modified (multi)set can be computed in time
proportional to the degree of modification.
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The incremental update property makes homomorphic hashing a very useful and versatile primitive. It
has found applications in many areas of computer security and algorithmics, including network coding [3]
and verifiable peer-to-peer content distribution [4], secure Internet routing [5], Byzantine fault tolerance [6,
7], streaming set and multiset equality comparison [8], and various aspects of database security, such as
access pattern privacy [9] and integrity protection [10].
This latter use case provides a simple example of how the primitive is used in practice: one can use
homomorphic hashing to verify the integrity of a database with a transaction log, by computing a hash value
for each transaction in such a way that the hash of the complete database state is equal to the (appropriately-
defined) sum of the hashes of all transactions. Another observation [11] is that homomorphic hashing can
be used for incremental and parallel hashing of lists, arrays, strings and other similar data structures: for
example, the list (b1, . . . , bn) can be represented as the set {(1, b1), . . . , (n, bn)}, and it suffices to apply the
homomorphic hash function to that set.
Constructing homomorphic hash functions
A framework for constructing provably secure homomorphic hash functions (in some suitably idealized
model, such as the random oracle model) was introduced by Bellare and Micciancio [11], and later extended
to the multiset hash setting by Clarke et al. [10], and revisited by Cathalo et al. [8].
Roughly speaking, the framework of Bellare and Micciancio can be described as follows. To construct
a (multi)set homomorphic hash function on A, one can start with a usual hash function Hˆ from A to some
additive group G, and extend it to finite subsets of A (resp. multisets on A) by setting H({a1, . . . , an}) =
Hˆ(a1) + · · · + Hˆ(an) (resp. H({am11 , . . . , amnn }) = m1 · Hˆ(a1) + · · · + mn · Hˆ(an), where mi is the
multiplicity of ai). And in fact, it is clear that all possible homomorphic hash functions arise in that way.
Note that as in Clarke et al. [10], and unlike the original framework of Bellare and Miciancio [11], there
is no block index i included in the hash Hˆ(ai) of each element ai, because we are hashing unordered
sets/multisets, rather than ordered sequences of blocks.
Assume that the underlying hash function Hˆ is ideal (i.e. it behaves like a random oracle). Then we
can ask when the corresponding homomorphic hash function H is secure (collision resistant, say). This
translates to a knapsack-like number-theoretic assumption on the group G, which Bellare and Micciancio
show holds, for example, when the discrete logarithm problem is hard in G.
Concretely, Bellare and Micciancio and the authors of subsequent works propose a number of possible
instantiations for H which essentially amount to choosing G = Z×p or G = Znm for suitable parameters
p,m, n. These concrete instantiations yield simple implementations, but they all suffer from suboptimal
output size (they require outputs of several thousand bits to achieve collision resistance at the 128 security
level), and their efficiency is generally unsatisfactory. Essentially all practical applications of homomorphic
hashing in the security literature seem to focus on the case G = Z×p , called MuHash.
Our contributions
Within Bellare and Micciancio’s framework, constructing a homomorphic hash function amounts to choos-
ing a group G where the appropriate number-theoretic assumption holds, together with a hash function to G
whose behavior is close enough to ideal for the security proof to go through.
In this paper, we propose a novel concrete construction of a multiset hash function by choosing G as the
group of points of a binary elliptic curves, and picking the hash function following the approach of Brier et
al. [12] (which we improve upon slightly) applied to the binary curve variant of Shallue and van de Woesti-
jne’s encoding function [13]. We also describe a software implementation of our proposal (building upon
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the work of Aranha et al. [14] for binary curve hashing, and using BLAKE2 [15] as the actual underlying
hash function) and provide extensive performance results showing that our function outperforms existing
methods by a large margin on modern CPU architectures (especially those supporting carry-less multiplica-
tion). Furthermore, choosing an elliptic curve (with small cofactor) for the group of hash values solves the
“output size” problem of homomorphic hashing outright: O(2n) collision security is achieved with roughly
2n-bit long digests. Yet, they do not seem to have been used in concrete implementations of homomorphic
hashing so far1. One can wonder why; the most likely explanation is that usual methods for hashing to el-
liptic curves are far too inefficient to make curves attractive from a performance standpoint: almost all such
methods require at least one full size exponentiation in the base field of the curve, which will be much more
costly by itself than the single multiplication (in a much larger field) required by MuHash—even on curves
over fast prime fields at the 128-bit security level [14], such an encoding function is over 3 times slower than
MuHash at equivalent security on Haswell, and over 20 times slower than our construction. Only by using
binary curves and relatively sophisticated implementation techniques do we avoid that stumbling block and
prove that elliptic curves can be competitive. As a result, we achieve a processing speed of over 3 million
set elements per second on a 4 GHz Intel Haswell CPU at the 128-bit security level. Speedups are expected
with the release of Intel Broadwell processors and its improved implementation of carry-less multiplication.
Are binary elliptic curves safe?
Recently, new developments have been announced regarding the asymptotic complexity of the discrete log-
arithm problem on binary elliptic curves, particularly by Semaev [16]. These results are somewhat con-
troversial, since they are based on heuristic assumptions that prevailing evidence suggests are unlikely to
hold [17, 18], and their storage requirements appear to make them purely theoretical anyway [19].
However, if Semaev’s claims of an L[1/2] attack turn out to be correct, the asymptotic security of binary
elliptic curve-based ECMH would be reduced. The concrete security of our construction, on the other hand,
would be completely unaffected on curves of up to 300+ bits (and in particular at the 128-bit security level on
GLS254), since the claimed attack is worse than generic attacks on such curves. Moreover, even if actually
practical L[1/2] attacks were to be found, ECMH on binary curves is likely to remain attractive, since it
mainly competes against MuHash, which is vulnerable to an L[1/3] subexponential attack.
For all these reasons, we believe that ECMH on binary elliptic curves is a safe choice for security-minded
practitioners, and that the switch from MuHash to ECMH is entirely justified in view of the considerable
performance gain (which lets designers choose a higher security margin and still come out far ahead).
2 Homomorphic Multiset Hash Function
Formally, we define a multiset M ∈ Z(A) as a function with finite support mapping a base set A to the
integers Z. As an extension of the usual definition in which multiplicities are restricted to Z≥0, we allow
negative multiplicities as well. We will implicitly consider subsets S ⊆ A to be multisets in Z(A).
Clarke et al. [10] introduce a definition of a multiset hash function that efficiently supports incremen-
tally adding (multisets of) elements. We give a simpler (but nearly equivalent2) definition that makes the
connection to homomorphic hash functions [20] explicit:
1One can mention EECH [1] as relevant related work that also uses binary curves for hashing, but the authors didn’t consider
homomorphic hashing at all, and their functions seems poorly suited for that goal. See Section 8 for a more detailed discussion.
2We give a proof of equivalence (under a mild assumption) in appendix D.
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Definition 1. Let A be a set and let (G,+G) be a finite group. A function H : Z(A) → G that maps
multisets over the base set A to a point in G is said to be a homomorphic multiset hash function if H is a
group homomorphism from the pointwise-additive group of functions (Z(A),+) to (G,+G); equivalently,
H(M1 +M2) = H(M1) +G H(M2) for all M1,M2 ∈ Z(A). We define Hˆ : A→ G by Hˆ(a) = H({a}).
This definition minimally captures an intuitive notion of a multiset hash function that supports incremen-
tally adding and removing (multisets of) elements. These incremental updates are efficient assuming that
addition and negation inG can be performed efficiently andH(M) can be computed efficiently (e.g. in time
linear in the representation length of the non-zero values of M ). Note that since pointwise addition in Z(A)
is commutative, the relevant subgroup H(Z(A)) ≤ G is necessarily commutative, and therefore without loss
of generality we can assume that G is commutative. It may seem that it is too strong of an assumption to
require a group structure onG, or equivalently, that (multisets of) elements can be removed as well as added.
In fact, provided that +G is lossless, in that a +G b = a +G c implies b = c, there is no loss of generality.
We show in appendix C that we can construct a group that supports (efficient) incremental removals based
only on (efficient) incremental additions.
Since the set of singleton subsets of A generates the group (Z(A),+), H can conversely be uniquely
defined by Hˆ:
H(M) =
∑
a∈A
M(a) · Hˆ(a).
Indeed, this is precisely the randomize-then-combine paradigm proposed by Bellare and Micciancio [11] for
incremental hashing of messages, which is readily (in fact, more naturally than to message hashing) applied
by Clarke et al. [10] to multiset hashing. Our goal is to minimize the computational cost for computing H
and the representation size for elements of G while achieving a given level of collision resistance.
Collision resistance
A collision for a hash function H is a pair x, x′ such that x 6= x′ but H(x) = H(x′). For any group-
homomorphic hash function H from a group (X,+) to (G,+), a collision can equivalently be defined as
a value x ∈ kerH \ {0X}. By the birthday bound that applies to any hash function, a collision can be
found with at most expected O(
√|G|) hash computations; we can hope to design a multiset hash function
for which expected time Ω(
√|G|) is also a lower bound.3
A preimage attack seeks to invert the hash function, namely to find a value x such that H(x) = y, for a
random element y in the image ofH . We can hope to design a multiset hash function for which the expected
time complexity of the best preimage attack is also equal to the generic upper bound Ω(|G|). Note that for
a homomorphic hash function we do not consider preimage attacks on the identity element 0G, since its
preimage is fixed.
A second preimage attack seeks to find a value x′ such that H(x′) = H(x), for some known value
x. Since a second preimage implies a collision, the time complexity of a second preimage attack is
lower bounded by the time complexity of the best collision attack, ideally Ω(
√|G|). For a general, non-
homomorphic hash function, we can hope that the best attack has expected Ω(|G|) time complexity. For
any homomorphic hash function, however, the group structure implies that a second preimage attack is no
harder than a collision attack (with expected time complexity upper-bounded by O(
√|G|)).
3In this and the other collision bounds that follow, it is assumed that the expectations are taken over a random choice of hash
function H and group (G,+G) from some hash function family (distribution)H.
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3 Generic multiset hash families
A random oracle Hˆ : A → G clearly achieves the optimal preimage resistance of Θ(|G|) and the optimal
collision resistance of Θ(
√|G|), in the sense that at least this many oracle queries are needed to compute
preimages and collisions respectively.
It does not follow, however, that the associated multiset hash function H = HG : Z(A) → G has the
same security level; for example, if we choose G = Zn2 , then O(n) oracle queries, instead of Ω(2n), are
enough to find arbitrary preimages in polynomial time by solving a simple n × n linear system over Z2.
However, Bellare and Micciancio [11] have shown (in the set hash setting, but this generalizes naturally
to multisets) how to obtain a security reduction for HG based on a computational hardness assumption on
the group G. For concrete choices of G, that hardness assumption is related to standard number theoretic
problems, such as the discrete logarithm problem or modular knapsacks.
When G = Z×p , the resulting multiset hash function HG is essentially MSet-Mu-Hash [10], the mul-
tiset variant of MuHash [11]. When G = Znm, we essentially obtain MSet-VAdd-Hash [10], the multiset
variant of LtHash (for n > 1) or AdHash (for n = 1) [11]. These functions all have security reductions
in the framework sketched above.
It is relatively easy to find plausible concrete instantiations of the random oracle Hˆ to a group like Zn2 ,
but for more general groups, this is usually more complicated, and as a result it is often convenient to replace
Hˆ by a pseudo-random oracle, i.e. a construction that is indifferentiable from a random oracle in the sense
of Maurer et al. [21]. Typically, we can take Hˆ of the form Hˆ(a) = f
(
h(a)
)
where h : A→ X is a random
oracle to some intermediate set X (such as bit strings, so that we can plausibly instantiate it with standard
hash function constructions like SHA-24) and f : X → G is an admissible encoding function [22, 12] that
has the property of mapping the uniform distribution overX to a distribution indistinguishable from uniform
over G.
Security bounds
AdHash is appealing for its simplicity, but is far from optimal in terms of hash code size. In the set
hashing setting (i.e.M(a) ∈ {0, 1}), the best known attack is the generalized birthday attack [23]; under the
assumption that this attack is optimal, the group Z2n corresponds to a security level of roughly 2
√
n bits. In
the multiset hashing setting, AdHash is completely impractical due to the extremely large hash code sizes
n required to defeat lattice reduction attacks described in appendix B.
There are reductions from computing discrete logarithms in a group G to finding collisions in the cor-
responding random oracle multiset hash function HG [24, 11, 10]. These reductions can be used to prove
a collision resistance property for the generic multiset hash family over any group in which computing dis-
crete logarithms is hard, such as Z×p . However, because discrete logarithms in Z×p can be solved by e.g.
the Number Field Sieve with (heuristic) subexponential time complexity Lp
[
1/3, 3
√
64/9
]
[25, p. 128], it
is usually estimated that we need to choose p of around 3200 bits for 128-bit security (see for example the
evaluation of the ECRYPT II report on key sizes [26]). In contrast, in a generic group, discrete logarithms
cannot be computed faster than expected time Θ(
√|G|), which is also the optimal collision resistance.
4We will assume that elements of A can be readily encoded as octet strings.
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4 Elliptic Curve Multiset Hash
For properly chosen elliptic curves over finite fields, there are no known algorithms for solving the discrete
logarithm problem in the elliptic curve group faster than in a generic group, i.e. expected time Θ(
√|G|).
Therefore, there is a clear possibility for using an elliptic curve group to obtain a given level of collision
resistance with a much lower group size than with MSet-Mu-Hash.
Applying the generic multiset hash construction to elliptic curve groups presents a problem, however:
while it is easy to define a very efficient admissible encoding from {0, 1}k to Z×p for sufficiently large k, an
admissible encoding to an elliptic curve group is not so easily defined. While constructions for admissible
encoding functions have been demonstrated [12], their computational cost is higher than we would like.
4.1 Generalized discrete logarithm security reduction
In fact, we can significantly relax the requirement on the encoding function f and still obtain a very tight
reduction, due to random self-reducibility of the discrete logarithm problem. Our relaxed requirement is
related to the definition of α-weak encodings by Brier et al. [12], and is satisfied in practice by a large class
of encoding functions [12].
Definition 2. A function f : S → R between finite sets is said to be an (α, β)-weak encoding, for integer
α ≥ 1 and real value β ≥ 1, if it satisfies the following properties:
1. Samplable: there is an efficient randomized algorithm for computing |f−1(r)| and sampling uniformly
from f−1(r) for any r ∈ R.
2. |f−1(r)| ≤ α for all r ∈ R.
3. IEr[|f−1(r)|/α] ≥ 1/β.
An (α, β)-weak encoding function f allows us to efficiently sample s ∈ S uniformly at random using β
uniform samples r ∈ R in expectation, with the property that f(s) = r for any accepted sample s obtained
from r.5
Definition 3. Let f : X → G be an (α, β)-weak encoding from X to the abelian group G. Assume that G
admits as a direct factor a cyclic subgroup 〈g〉 of prime order ρ, and that we can efficiently sample from the
complement group 〈g〉 in the direct factor decompositionH = 〈g〉⊕〈g〉. Given a random oracle h : A→ X ,
we denote by Hˆf the function A → G given by Hˆf (a) = f
(
h(a)
)
, and by Hf : Z(A) → G the associated
multiset hash function.
The following theorem shows that finding a collision in Hf with multiplicities up to ρ− 1 is as hard as
computing discrete logarithms to the base g, up to a small factor that depends on β. Note that Hf does not
depend on the choice of subgroup 〈g〉, but the strongest security result is obtained by choosing the largest
prime-order subgroup. The requirement of efficient samplability of 〈g〉 is easily satisfied in practice, since
efficiency concerns regarding representation size dictate that 〈g〉 be as small as possible (usually having at
most 8 elements, and most of the time only 1 or 2).
5Under the definition of Brier et al. [12], an α-weak encoding f is an (α|S|/|R|, α2|S|/|R|)-weak encoding. Our definition
allows for a tighter bound to be given in theorem 1.
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Theorem 1. Let Hf be a multiset hash function as in definition 3. Given an algorithm C with access to the
underlying random oracle h that finds a non-empty multiset M ∈ kerHf with |M |∞ < ρ, in expected time
t′ with probability ′ using q queries to h, discrete logarithms to the base g can be computed with probability
 = ′/2 in expected time t + T1 + qT2 + qβT3 + LT4, where L ≥ |M |0 is a bound on the length of the
output of C; T1, . . . , T4 denote the time required for a constant number of group operations, and are given
in the proof.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Concretely, if G = E(Fpm) is the group of Fpm-rational points on a suitable elliptic curve E chosen to
avoid any discrete logarithm weaknesses, with a subgroup 〈g〉 of prime order ρ ≥ |G|/4, and f is an (α, β)-
weak encoding function with small constant β, then Hf has collision resistance roughly pm/2/2. Since an
element of E(Fpm) can be represented using dlog2 pme bits, the collision resistance of Hf is essentially
optimal (to within a few bits).
4.2 Shallue-van de Woestijne (SW) encoding in characteristic 2
The Shallue-van de Woestijne (SW) algorithm for characteristic 2 fields [13] can be used to map any point
w ∈ F2m to a pair (x, y) ∈ (F2n)2 satisfying an arbitrary elliptic curve equation
Ea,b : y
2 + x · y = x3 + a · x2 + b, (1)
where a, b ∈ F2m . It constructs three values of x from w with the property that at least one necessarily
has a corresponding value y satisfying eq. (1). In addition to the usual arithmetic operations over F2m , its
definition depends on three linear maps:
1. the trace function Tr: F2m → F2 defined by Tr(x) =
∑m−1
i=0 x
2i ; [27, p. 130]
2. a quadratic solver function QS: {x ∈ F2m |Tr(x) = 0} → F2m that satisfies QS(x)2 + QS(x) = x
and QS(0) = 0;
3. coeff0 : F2m → F2 where coeff0(x) is the zeroth coefficient of any (fixed) polynomial representation
of x.
An optimized version of the algorithm that requires only a single field inversion [14] is shown as al-
gorithm 1. The algorithm is parameterized by a value t ∈ F2m satisfying t4 + t 6= 0; for fields of degree
m > 4, we can choose t = z where z is the indeterminate in the polynomial representation of F2m . The
result (x, λ) = (x, x+ y/x) is represented in λ-affine coordinates [28] for efficiency.6 The addition to λ of
coeff0(w) in line 12 is not part of the original SW algorithm; this trivial addition serves to halve the number
of collisions at essentially no extra cost.
It is clear from the definition that the number of preimages of any point (x, λ) under SWCHAR2 is at
most α = 3, since c ∈ {t−1j · x | j = 1, 2, 3} and w is uniquely determined from c, x, and λ by
w ∈ {QS(c− a),QS(c− a) + 1},
coeff0(w) = λ+ x+ QS(x
−2 · b+ x+ a).
6There is exactly one point with x = 0 satisfying eq. (1): (x = 0, y =
√
b). When using λ-affine coordinates, this value must
be represented specially.
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Algorithm 1. Optimized Shallue–van de Woestijne encoding in characteristic 2 [14]
Require: t ∈ F2m such that t · (t+ 1) · (t2 + t+ 1) = t4 + t 6= 0
Precompute: t1 = tt2+t+1 , t2 =
1+t
t2+t+1
, t3 =
t·(1+t)
t2+t+1
; t−1j = 1/tj for j = 1, 2, 3
1: function SWCHAR2(w ∈ F2m ; a, b ∈ F2m)
2: c← w2 + w + a
3: if c = 0 then . This condition may hold only if Tr(a) = 0
4: return (x = 0, y =
√
b) . This is the single point satisfying eq. (1) with x = 0
5: end if
6: c−1 ← 1/c
7: for j = 1 to 3 do
8: x← tj · c
9: x−1 ← t−1j · c−1
10: hj ← (x−1)2 · b+ x+ a
11: if Tr(hj) = 0 then . This condition necessarily holds for at least one j
12: λ← QS(hj) + x+ coeff0(w) . c does not depend on coeff0(w)
13: return (x, λ) . y = (λ+ x) · x = QS(hj) · x
14: end if
15: end for
16: end function
The preimage set for any point (x, λ) can be efficiently computed by these same formulas. Furthermore,
Aranha et al. [14] show that the proportion of curve points with k preimages under SWCHAR2 for k =
0, 1, 2, 3 is 9/32, 15/32, 7/32, and 1/32, respectively, up to an error term of O(2−n/2). It follows that
IEP [|SWCHAR2−1(P )|/α] = 1/3±O(2−n/2), and therefore, SWCHAR2 is an (α, β)-weak encoding with
β = 3 +O(2−n/2).
4.3 Hash function definition
Based on this encoding function, we define the elliptic curve multiset hash (ECMH): given a binary elliptic
curve group Ea,b(F2m) and an intermediate hash function h : A → Z2m (modeled as a random oracle), we
define ECMHa,b,h(x) = SWCHAR2(h(x); a, b). Commonly used elliptic curves over F2m , including the
NIST-recommended ones, have a generator of prime order ρ > 2m−2 with an easily determined complement
group of size h = |〈g〉| ≤ 4. Thus, the samplability requirement on 〈g〉 is easily satisfied in practice. Hence,
by theorem 1, finding a collision in ECMH is as hard (up to a small constant factor) as computing discrete
logarithms to the base g, which we assume to be O(2m/2).
Similar suitable encoding algorithms exist for elliptic curves over fields of characteristic p > 2 [13, 12],
and could also be used to define an elliptic curve multiset hash. However, the use of a characteristic 2 field
eliminates the need for an expensive field exponentiation in order to solve a quadratic equation, which would
otherwise dominate the computation time, and on modern CPUs that support fast carry-less multiplication,
fast implementations of all other required field operations are also possible for characteristic 2 [29].
4.4 Compressed representation of curve points
The group of F2m-rational points on an elliptic curve Ea,b has order |Ea,b(F2m)| ≈ 2m. Each point is
naturally represented as a pair (x, y) ∈ F22m (or (x, λ) ∈ F22m), but there is a well-known method for
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encoding a point using just m+ 1 bits: given x there are at most two possible values for y (or λ) if (x, y) (or
(x, λ)) satisfy Ea,b, and they can be recovered efficiently using a small number of field operations. Thus, a
point can be encoded by its x value and a single additional bit to disambiguate the two possible points. The
elliptic curve group identity element (the point at infinity) can be encoded specially without increasing the
representation size, by using a bit sequence that would not otherwise encode a valid point.
5 Implementation
We developed an optimized implementation of elliptic curve multiset hash (ECMH) as an open-source C++
library [30], with support for all NIST-recommended binary elliptic curves [31] and the record-breaking
GLS254 curve [28], as well as several other SEC 2-recommended curves [32]. Using a combination of C++
templates and code generation, we were able to write generic code to support many different configurations
without sacrificing runtime performance; only for modular reduction was a custom implementation required
for each supported field. We incorporated existing fast x86/x86-64 polynomial multiplication, squaring, and
modular reduction routines for F2163 , F2193 , F2233 , F2239 , F2283 , F2409 , F2571 [33] and for F2127 [28].
We implemented field inversion using a polynomial-basis Itoh–Tsujii inversion method making use of
multi-squaring tables [34, 29, 28, 14]. We generated field inversion routines for each field degree auto-
matically based on an A* search procedure for computing the optimal Itoh–Tsujii addition chain and set of
multi-squaring tables, based on a machine-specific cost model estimated from field operation performance
measurements [35].
We also developed optimized implementations of the MSet-Mu-Hash and MSet-Add-Hash hash
functions, based on the modular arithmetic functions in the OpenSSL library version 1.0.1i, for the purpose
of comparison.
5.1 Intermediate hash function
ECMH requires an intermediate hash function h : A→ Z2m . Under our assumption that the base setA is the
set of octet strings, we simply require a standard cryptographic hash function (modeled as a random oracle)
with output size m. Given the inherent property of any homomorphic hash function that a single collision
leads to arbitrary second preimages, we advise using a keyed hash function when possible to minimize risk.
Any standard hash function with fixed output size greater than m bits can simply be truncated to m
bits. Standard expansion techniques can be used to efficiently generate an arbitrary length m output from
a hash function with fixed output size b < m. Sponge constructions, such as Keccak [36], are particularly
convenient since they support arbitrary output sizes.
Both AdHash and MuHash similarly require intermediate hash functions, but with much larger output
sizes m for equivalent security levels.
We designed our implementation to support arbitrary hash functions, but for our performance evaluation,
we selected BLAKE2 [15] because of its state-of-the-art performance. Form ≤ 256, we used the BLAKE2s
variant (256-bit output), truncating the output tom bits. For 256 < m ≤ 512, we used the BLAKE2b variant
(512-bit output) with truncation. For m > 512, we used BLAKE2b repeatedly to generate sufficient output,
in such a way that the underlying compression function is called a minimum number of times.
5.2 Linear field operations
Several key operations for F2m , such as squaring, multi-squaring (x 7→ x2i), square root, and half-trace, are
linear in the coefficients. For multi-squaring (useful for inversion) and half-trace, an implementation based
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on a lookup table can be significantly faster than direct computation [37, 29, 28, 14]. The coefficients are
split into dm/βe blocks of β bits, and a separate table of 2β entries is precomputed for each block position,
using a total of sm,β = dm/βe · 2β · dm/W e ·W/8 bytes of memory, where W is the word size in bits.
The linear transform can then be computed from the precomputed tables with k = dm/β · dm/W e memory
accesses and k − 1 XOR operations.
5.3 Blinding for side-channel resistance
The fastest implementation of ECMH is susceptible to timing and cache side-channel attacks, due to the
use of lookup tables (for inversion and QS), and the use of branching (for SWCHAR2). A branch-free
implementation of SWCHAR2 adds only a few additional multiplications and squarings. Lookup tables
are unavoidable for good performance, but we can blind inversion at a cost of just two multiplications and
generation of one random field element. We likewise can blind QS at a cost of 1 squaring, 2 additions, and
generation of one random field element, as well as a few bit operations to ensure the random element is in
the image of QS. In this way we can fully protect against timing and cache side-channel attacks at only a
small additional cost.
5.4 Quadratic extension field
For evenm, representing F2m as a quadratic extension of F2m/2 results in significantly faster field operations
relative to an odd-degree field of roughly the same size: inversion in the extension field requires only one
inversion in the base field (effectively reducing the memory and computation costs by nearly a factor of 4
for a table-based multi-squaring implementation), and half-trace requires only 2 half-trace computations in
the base field (reducing, for a table-based implementation, the computation cost by a factor of 2 and the
memory requirement by a factor of 4) [28]. We use this representation to support the GLS254 elliptic curve
over F2254 [28].
5.5 In-memory representation of elliptic curve points
Although an element in the elliptic curve group of points Ea,b(F2m) can be represented directly using the
standard affine (x, y)-representation or the λ-affine (x, λ) representation, and more compactly using just
m + 1 bits as described in section 4.4, we can more efficiently perform group operations using the λ-
projective representation (x˜, λ˜, z) corresponding to the λ-affine representation (x = x˜/z, λ = λ˜/z): This
representation allows point addition and point doubling to be performed without any field inversions [28].
5.6 Batch SWCHAR2 computation
A large fraction of the computational cost of our elliptic curve multiset hash construction is due to the single
field inversion required by the SWCHAR2 encoding function. Using Montgomery’s trick, n independent
elements can be inverted simultaneously at the cost of just 1 field inversion and 3(n − 1) field multiplica-
tions [38]. Since field inversion is much more than 3 times as expensive as field multiplication, this provides
significant computational savings.
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5.7 Montgomery domain for MSet-Mu-Hash
A key cost in a naı¨ve implementation of MSet-Mu-Hash is the reduction modulo p required by multipli-
cation in Z×p . To avoid this cost, we can use the Montgomery reduction [39] defined by
Redc(t; p, r) = t · r−1 mod p, 0 ≤ t < p · r, r > p, gcd(r, p) = 1.
If r is chosen to be a power of 2, or a power of 2w, where w is the word size, then the computational cost of
Redc is significantly lower than a reduction modp.
We represent an element x ∈ Z×p as a triplet (w, y, z) ∈ Zp−1×Z×P ×Z×p corresponding to y/z ·rw mod
p, where r is the Montgomery reduction constant. Multiplication under this representation is defined by
(w1, y1, z1) · (w2, y2, z2) = (w1 + w2,Redc(y1y2),Redc(z1z2));
(w1, y1, z1) · (w2, y2, 1) = (w1 + w2 + 1,Redc(y1y2), z1);
(w1, y1, z1) · (w2, 1, z2) = (w1 + w2 − 1, y1,Redc(z1z2)).
6 Performance measurement
As our test platforms we used an Intel Westmere i7-970 3.2 GHz CPU (with 12 MiB L3 cache) and an Intel
Haswell i7-4790K 4.0 GHz CPU (with 8 MiB L3 cache). Both of these processors support the PCLMULQDQ
instruction for carry-less multiplication, Westmere being the first Intel architecture to support it; on the much
more recent Haswell architecture, where this instruction has significantly lower cost, alternative modular
reduction routines based on it are used for F2163 , F2283 , and F2571 for a modest gain in performance [33].
Our implementation used a word size of W = 128 bits and a block size of B = 8 bits for all half trace and
multi-squaring tables. All code was compiled separately for each architecture using version 3.5 of the Clang
compiler at the highest optimization level.
6.1 Robust operation timing
We measured the execution time of all operations in CPU cycles, using the combination of RDTSC, RDTSCP,
and CPUID instructions recommended by Intel [40]. To improve accuracy and reduce variance, we disabled
TurboBoost, frequency scaling, and HyperThreading, and ensured that a single non-boot CPU core was
used for all benchmarks on each machine. For each operation, we estimated the benchmarking overhead
and subtracted it from the measured number of cycles. Additionally, we automatically determined a per-
measurement repeat count for each operation that ensured the benchmarking overhead was less than 10%.
The execution time was computed as the median of the cycle measurements; the number of cycle mea-
surements for each operation from which the median was computed was at least 1000 and chosen automat-
ically to ensure a sufficiently small 99% confidence interval on the median estimate (less than the larger of
1/1000 of the estimated median or 1/10 of a cycle). For consistency, we ensured warm-cache conditions for
all estimates by discarding the first 2000 measurements.
6.2 Consistent measurement of memory-dependent operations
For operations with data-dependent memory accesses, such as table-based multi-squaring, half trace compu-
tation, and the higher-level operations based on these primitives, we measured the aggregate execution time
for a set of inputs guaranteed to induce a uniform memory access pattern (and then divided by the number of
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Figure 1. Security level attained as a function of hash code size for Elliptic Curve Multiset Hash (ECMH), AdHash (restricted
to set hashing), and MuHash. For MuHash, the multiset hashing security level was determined based on the conjectured time-
complexity Lp
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of the Number Field Sieve for solving discrete logarithms in Z×p [25, p. 128]. For AdHash, we
determined a set hashing security level of 2
√
n corresponded to groups Z2n based on the assumption that the generalized birthday
attack [23] is optimal.
inputs), in order to obtain worst-case warm-cache estimates. Failure to do so results in a large underestimate
of execution time.
We also observed the performance characteristics of table operations to be significantly affected by the
size of the virtual memory pages backing the tables; in particular, on the x86-64 test machines, both the base
level performance and the scaling of execution times with increasing table size were significantly better with
2 MiB (huge) pages than with 4 KiB pages, due to the cost of translation lookaside buffer (TLB) misses. The
Linux transparent huge page support (introduced in Linux version 2.6.38) results in some, but not all, mem-
ory regions being backed automatically by huge pages, depending on a number of factors including region
alignment and physical memory fragmentation; when not taken into account, this significantly reduced the
reliability of our performance measurements. For consistent performance, we therefore ensured that all
lookup tables were backed by huge pages.
7 Results
In order to obtain performance results for a full range of security levels, we evaluated the performance of
ECMH using each of the following eight elliptic curves: sect163k1 [32] (NIST K-163 [31]), sect193r1 [32],
sect233k1 [32] (NIST K-233 [31]), sect239k1 [32], GLS254 [28], sect283k1 [32] (NIST K-283 [31]),
sect409k1 [32] (NIST K-409 [31]), and sect571k1 [32] (NIST K-571 [31]).
Based on theorem 1 and the assumed hardness of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem, the
ECMH using an elliptic curve group of order ρ has collision resistance of O(
√
ρ), corresponding to a se-
curity level log2 ρ bits. We also evaluated MuHash and AdHash (for set hashing only) using group sizes
corresponding to the same range of security levels. The correspondence between security level and hash
code size under each method is shown in fig. 1.
For each multiset hash H , we measured the computational cost of incremental hash code updates cor-
responding to a sequence of incremental additions or removals of multiset elements, i.e. incrementing or
decrementing by 1 the multiplicity of each element in the sequence. Larger changes in multiplicity can
also be handled efficiently by scalar multiplication in the group, but we expect incremental additions and
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Figure 2. Comparison of multiset hashing performance at different security levels. The elliptic curve corresponding to each security
level is given in table 1. The security level for AdHash applies only to set hashing, as described in appendix B.
removals to be the most common case. We used a sequence of 1024 randomly generated 32-byte strings;7
longer strings would simply impose an additional cost independent of H .
The average cost per element reflects the cost of the intermediate hash function based on BLAKE2,
the cost of encoding the expanded bit sequence as a group element, and the cost of one group operation
to add the encoded element to a running total. In the case of ECMH, the encoding is SWCHAR2 and the
group operation is implemented as the mixed addition of a λ-affine and a λ-projective point; batch ECMH
effectively replaces 1 field inversion by 3 multiplications, as described in section 5.6. In the case of AdHash,
the encoding is trivial and the group operation is simply integer addition; batch computation would offer no
advantage. For MuHash, the encoding requires a comparison and at most one subtraction, and the group
operation requires just a single Montgomery multiplication, as described in section 5.7; batch computation
would offer no advantage over the Montgomery representation already used.
The results are shown in fig. 2 and in table 1. Only element addition performance is shown, as due
to the representations used, element removal performance is nearly identical. Timings for point encoding,
compression, and decompression are given in table 2. Base field operation timings are given in table 3, and
a comparison of curve operation performance under λ-affine and λ-projective point representations is given
in table 4.
7As ECMH depends on lookup tables with a block size of B = 8, 1024 random elements ensures high coverage of the tables
and a random access pattern, in order to correctly estimate execution time, as described in section 6.2.
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Table 1 Comparison of multiset hashing performance, as in fig. 2. Note that the AdHash performance
applies only to set hashing.
Westmere cycles Haswell cycles
ECMH ECMH
n Curve single/ blind /batch/ blind MuHash AdHash single/ blind /batch/blind MuHash AdHash
81 sect163k1 3601 / 4436 /2023/ 2418 3939 2998 2199 / 2556 /1133/1349 2208 2186
96 sect193r1 4326 / 5444 /2595/ 3198 7384 3687 2342 / 2755 /1287/1580 3967 2674
116 sect233k1 4667 / 5726 /2444/ 2933 13414 5160 2605 / 2968 /1209/1495 7074 3708
119 sect239k1 5183 / 6361 /2630/ 3164 16532 5117 3061 / 3474 /1422/1700 8537 3684
127 GLS254 2835 / 3872 /2307/ 2882 20631 5920 1592 / 1973 /1184/1426 10472 4239
141 sect283k1 7524 / 9271 /3513/ 4254 33472 7286 3828 / 4291 /1733/2024 17251 5178
204 sect409k1 12621/16696/5686/ 6878 176767 14997 5788 / 6897 /2473/2948 84027 10632
285 sect571k1 23654/29628/9206/10746 890172 28485 11745/16664/4188/4940 467938 20152
Table 2 Performance of elliptic curve point encoding, compression (to a minimal-length bit string), and
decompression (from said bit string). Compression (comp.) and decompression (dec.) use λ-projective
coordinates. Batch encoding is with a batch size of 256.
Westmere cycles Haswell cycles
SWCHAR2 SWCHAR2
Curve single/ blind /batch/blind Comp. Dec. single/ blind /batch/blind Comp. Dec.
sect163k1 2629 / 3248 / 853 /1234 2222 2268 1500 / 1854 / 432 / 641 1370 1402
sect193r1 3217 / 4073 /1227/1821 2541 2669 1603 / 2014 / 548 / 823 1370 1443
sect233k1 3577 / 4340 /1076/1537 3080 3154 1852 / 2214 / 510 / 719 1673 1732
sect239k1 4033 / 4880 /1158/1670 3468 3569 2227 / 2616 / 570 / 817 2024 2045
GLS254 1671 / 2551 / 978 /1566 1166 1245 874 / 1280 / 437 / 709 665 716
sect283k1 5738 / 6865 /1587/2253 4772 5134 2822 / 3278 / 698 / 993 2320 2624
sect409k1 8612 /10523/2707/3720 7497 7563 4395 / 5172 /1157/1573 3883 4074
sect571k1 17968/21721/4301/5867 15174 16337 8987 /13329/1867/2573 7132 8448
14
Table 3 Field operation performance for F2m . Batch inversion is with a batch size of 256.
Westmere cycles Haswell cycles
Invert QS Invert QS
m Mul. Sq. single/ blind /batch/blind var. /blind Mul. Sq. single/blind/batch/blind var./blind
127 44 11 721 / 904 / 124 / 124 41 / 131 23 9 435 / 534 / 59 / 59 21 / 82
163 84 32 1807 / 2074 / 266 / 269 115 / 227 43 24 1159 /1309/ 127 / 127 67 / 152
193 113 26 2210 / 2533 / 343 / 344 149 / 264 46 20 1129 /1308/ 128 / 128 79 / 155
233 109 30 2745 / 3092 / 341 / 342 191 / 313 48 24 1439 /1583/ 131 / 131 95 / 178
239 119 34 3139 / 3492 / 372 / 376 187 / 313 51 31 1755 /1933/ 160 / 159 93 / 183
254 99 17 868 / 1211 / 310 / 313 88 / 245 38 15 514 / 664 / 111 / 116 62 / 158
283 148 36 4438 / 4869 / 473 / 474 420 / 560 55 28 2222 /2423/ 175 / 179 227/ 296
409 274 35 7899 / 8688 / 884 / 867 807 / 959 93 30 3500 /3805/ 291 / 296 404/ 478
571 431 65 16217/17808/1308/1323 1457/1692 168 38 6873 /7611/ 464 / 489 737/ 842
Table 4 Performance of elliptic curve group operations using λ-affine and λ-projective point representations.
The result of point addition or doubling is always represented in λ-projective coordinates.
Westmere cycles Haswell cycles
Add Double Negate Add Double Negate
Curve aff. /mix. / full aff./proj. aff./proj. aff./mix. / full aff./proj. aff./proj.
sect163k1 500 / 748 /1016 192/ 472 12 / 18 213/ 305 / 408 105/ 188 6 / 9
sect193r1 604 / 952 /1268 199/ 640 12 / 18 236/ 370 / 468 105/ 281 7 / 9
sect233k1 624 / 936 /1276 202/ 540 12 / 18 235/ 341 / 462 107/ 224 7 / 10
sect239k1 684 /1032/1388 244/ 620 12 / 18 308/ 453 / 595 144/ 311 6 / 9
GLS254 572 / 856 /1168 162/ 488 9 / 14 219/ 308 / 435 78 / 196 5 / 9
sect283k1 864 /1308/1792 280/ 768 15 / 23 329/ 489 / 655 138/ 302 12 / 19
sect409k1 1496/2320/3144 416/1280 18 / 29 542/ 788 /1075 194/ 506 12 / 22
sect571k1 2276/3516/4772 644/1956 21 / 35 859/1253/1688 296/ 740 15 / 22
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8 Discussion
Elliptic curve multiset hash significantly outperforms the existing methods of MuHash and AdHash, partic-
ularly in the batch setting, while requiring significantly smaller hash codes at all security levels. In fact, the
hash code size is essentially optimal. Because the single field inversion required by the encoding function
SWCHAR2 accounts for a large fraction of the computational cost, particularly with larger field degrees,
the use of Montgomery’s trick in the batch setting significantly reduces the computational cost. The lower
computational cost at the 127-bit security level is due to the efficiency of the GLS254 curve implementation;
the quadratic extension field representation of F2254 employed, and the close match of the degree to the word
size W = 128, significantly reducing the cost of field operations. Quadratic extension field representations
for other fields, such as F2502 , could potentially be used to obtain similar performance improvements at
other security levels. Furthermore, our choice of parameters follows the trend of increasing native support
to binary field arithmetic in Desktop processors and will likely benefit from improvements to the carry-less
multiplication instruction in the recently released Broadwell processor family.
Our work is very related to the Encrypted Elliptic Curve Hash (EECH) [1]. That construction also en-
codes separate bit strings as points on a binary elliptic curve and then combines those points using point ad-
dition. Like our approach, it relies on the property of binary elliptic curves that curve points can be decoded
from a non-redundant representation without expensive field exponentiations, using instead a precomputed
lookup table for half-trace, and notes that better performance may be obtained using batch inversion and
hardware support for carry-less multiplication.
The full EECH construction is proposed as an incremental hash for bit strings (the message is split
into fixed-size blocks, and each block, concatenated with the block index, is encoded as an elliptic curve
point). In contrast to our elliptic curve multiset hash, it is specifically designed to avoid reliance on an un-
derlying random oracle, relying instead on redundancy/padding in the point encoding function for collision
resistance.
While the full construction is not well-suited to homomorphic multiset hashing8, we can make the fairer
comparison between our ECMH construction and a straightforward randomize-then-combine-style [11] con-
struction over binary elliptic curve groups using the implementation techniques proposed for EECH. Such a
construction was neither explicitly proposed nor implemented, and there was no prior evidence that it would
be practical performance wise. Our work goes significantly beyond this:
• We provide a thorough empirical analysis of performance, and demonstrate for the first time that
an elliptic curve-based multiset hash actually significantly exceeds the performance of AdHash and
MuHash.
• We demonstrate that a fully blinded implementation is possible at only a minor performance penalty.
We also demonstrate batch variants of both the regular and fully-blinded implementations that are
significantly faster. In contrast, the try-and-increment encoding method proposed for EECH has no
guaranteed time bound, making it unavoidably susceptible to timing attacks, and less amenable to
speedup by batch inversion.
8Using an elliptic curve over F2m , under the EECH construction at most b bits of input data can be encoded per point to retain
collision resistance of 2m−b. Optimal collision resistance of 2m for the representation size requires that b ≤ m/2. Each multiset
element a ∈ A (assumed to be a bit string) must therefore be split into one or more blocks of b bits, each encoded as a separate
elliptic curve point. For elements longer than b bits, this is likely to be significantly more expensive than hashing a with a fast hash
function like BLAKE2 and then encoding the result into a single elliptic curve point. EECH also offers no preimage resistance by
default. There is a proposed pairing-based variant PEECH that relies on an elliptic curve pairing to define a homomorphic one-way
function. This provides preimage resistance at the cost of significantly higher computational cost and representation size.
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• Our security proof is based on existing techniques [11, 12] but the security bound we obtain is novel
in several ways:
– The hash function Hˆ into the elliptic curve group need not be indistinguishable from a random
oracle, but is instead permitted to satisfy the weaker property of being an (α, β)-weak encoding,
which significantly reduces the computational cost.
– The hash function Hˆ can map to the full elliptic curve group, rather than only a cyclic subgroup,
as is required by EECH. This allows for a simpler implementation that does not rely on patent-
encumbered techniques [2] for efficiently testing for subgroup membership.
It was originally suggested [11] that while finding collisions in MuHash is provably as hard as the
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), the converse is not necessarily true: it may be that MuHash is still
collision resistant even if discrete logarithms can be computed efficiently. In fact, though, by computing
discrete logarithms, finding a collision in MuHash can be reduced to finding a collision in AdHash. It
would therefore be susceptible to a generalized birthday attack [23] in the set hashing setting or to lattice
reduction attacks in the multiset hashing setting. The same reduction applies to our elliptic curve multiset
hash, and is even more effective because of the smaller group order.
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A Security reduction based on (α, β)-weak encodings
We prove theorem 1, which reduces solving discrete logarithms to finding collisions in a homomorphic
multiset hash function based on an (α, β)-weak encoding.
Theorem 1. Let Hf be a multiset hash function as in definition 3. Given an algorithm C with access to the
underlying random oracle h that finds a non-empty multiset M ∈ kerHf with |M |∞ < ρ, in expected time
t′ with probability ′ using q queries to h, discrete logarithms to the base g can be computed with probability
 = ′/2 in expected time t + T1 + qT2 + qβT3 + LT4, where L ≥ |M |0 is a bound on the length of the
output of C; T1, . . . , T4 denote the time required for a constant number of group operations, and are given
in the proof.
Proof. Let a Q ∈ 〈P 〉, for which we wish to find n ∈ Z such that n · P = Q, be given. We simulate each
successive distinct query h(ai) to the random oracle h for i = 1, . . . , k using the following algorithm:
1. Sample uniformly at random ri ∈ Zρ, di ∈ {0, 1}, Ji ∈ 〈P 〉, j ∈ Zdαe.
2. Compute Qi = riQ + diP + Ji. Note that since 〈P 〉 has prime order, Q is a generator of 〈P 〉, and
therefore Qi is distributed uniformly in G.
3. If j < |f−1(Qi)|, sample xi from f−1(Qi) uniformly at random. Otherwise, resample ri, di, Ji, and
j.
4. Return xi. Note that xi is uniformly distributed in X , and the expected number of sampling attempts
is α/β.
Under the simulated h, C finds a non-empty M ∈ kerH in expected time t with success probability .
Consider the case that a collision is found. (Otherwise, we fail to compute the discrete logarithm.) Without
loss of generality, we can assume M is non-zero only for values ai on which h was queried. Thus, we have
0G =
k∑
i=1
M(ai) · h(ai) =
k∑
i=1
M(ai) ·Qi
=
k∑
i=1
M(ai) · [ri ·Q+ di · P + Ji] ,
which implies
r ·Q+
k∑
i=1
Ji ·M(ai) = −d · P, (2)
where
r =
k∑
i=1
ri ·M(ai) mod ρ, d =
k∑
i=1
di ·M(ai) mod ρ.
Since r · Q ∈ 〈P 〉 and −d · P ∈ 〈P 〉, it follows that ∑ki=1 Ji ·M(ai) = OG in eq. (2); we therefore have
r · Q = −d · P . Since M is non-empty, there exists a value i such that M(ai) 6= 0. Consider that the
distribution of di conditioned on Q1, . . . , Qk is still uniform in {0, 1}, and therefore Pr(di = 0) = 1/2, and
hence, Pr(d = 0) ≤ 1/2. If d 6= 0, then r 6= 0, and therefore Pr(r 6= 0) ≥ 1/2.
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If r = 0, we fail to compute the discrete logarithm. Otherwise, r has an inverse r−1 in Z×ρ and we have
Q = r−1rQ = −r−1dP . Thus, n = −r−1d is a solution to the discrete logarithm problem. Since we only
fail if C fails or r = 0, we find a solution with probability at least /2.
Each query ai to the simulated random oracle requires a table lookup to check if ai has been queried
previously. If it has not, we must repeatedly sample ri, di, Ji and j and compute Qi = riQ + diP + Ji in
time
T3 = Tsamp(Zρ) + Tsamp(Z2) + Tsamp(〈g〉) + Texp(G) + 2Tmult(G),
until j < |f−1(Qi)|, which requires β attempts in expectation, since f is an (α, β)-weak encoding. We then
sample xi ∈ f−1(Qi). Thus, each of the q queries to the random oracle require expected time βT3 + T2,
where
T2 = Tlookup + Tsamp(f
−1).
We can compute r and d as a sum of L terms in time L · T4, where
T4 = Tlookup + 2Tadd(Zρ) + Tmult(Zρ).
Finally, we can compute n from r and d in time
T1 = Tinv(Zρ) + Tmult(Zρ) + Tnegate(Zρ).
Thus, the total expected time is t+ T1 + qT2 + qβT3 + LT4.
B Security analysis of AdHash in the multiset setting
The best known attack on Bellare and Micciancio’s incremental hash function AdHash when it is used
to hash sets is Wagner’s generalized birthday attack [23]. However, when the function is used for multiset
hashing, as proposed by Clarke et al. [10, Theorem 6], its security is much weaker. Indeed, finding a multiset
collision on AdHash with q random oracle queries is equivalent to finding a vector (a1, . . . , aq) ∈ Zq of
polynomial norm such that:
q∑
i=1
aihi ≡ 0 (mod M),
where the hi’s are the hash values returned by the oracle, and M is the AdHash modulus. In other words,
the problem is to find a short vector in the full rank lattice L ⊂ Zq of vectors orthogonal to (h1, . . . , hq)
modulo M .
The volume vol(L) = [Zq : L] of L is clearly at most M , since L is the kernel of a homomorphism to
Z/MZ. Therefore, a lattice reduction algorithm with Hermite factor constant c (see [41]) is expected to find
a vector in L of Euclidean norm at most cq ·M1/q. By choosing q =
√
logM
log c , we obtain a multiset collision
of size roughly 2
√
log2M · log2 c bits. For k bits of security against this multiset collision attack, it is thus
necessary to choose:
log2M ≥
k2
4 log2 c
.
This is similar to Wagner’s attack in the sense that the size of M should be at least quadratic in the security
parameter, but the constant is typically much larger. Over a large range of lattice dimensions, a security
level of k = 128 bits corresponds to a Hermite factor constant c ≈ 1.007 [42, 43]. Hence, a conservative
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choice of M should be at least 400,000-bit long, which is obviously impractical. Even k = 80 corresponds
to c ≈ 1.008 and requires M to be chosen larger than 100,000 bits.
At any rate, recommended sizes for the set-hash setting are highly insecure in the multiset hash setting.
Consider a modulus M of 1600 bits, appropriate for 80-bit security in the set-hash setting. Simply doing
q = 230 oracle queries and easily reducing the corresponding lattice with LLL (not even BKZ!), which has a
Hermite factor constant c ≈ 1.021, yields a multiset collision of weight about c230 · 21600/230 ≤ 15000 (less
that 14-bit long). Similarly, given a 4096-bit modulusM (as used for 128-bit security in the set-hash setting),
doing q = 500 queries and reduction the corresponding 500-dimensional lattice with BKZ-289, which has a
Hermite factor constant c ≈ 1.011 [41], yields a multiset collision of weight about c500 · 24096/500 ≤ 70000
(less than 17-bit long).
C Group structure implied by incremental additions
Consider a more limited definition of an incremental multiset hash function, under which only incremental
additions (and non-negative multiplicities) are supported:
Definition 4. Let A be a set, and let T be a finite set with an associative operation +T : T × T → T . A
function H : ZA≥0 → T is a monoid-homomorphic multiset hash function if H(M1 + M2) = H(M1) +T
H(M2) for all M1,M2 ∈ Z(A).
Note that (H(ZA≥0),+T ) is necessarily a commutative monoid under this definition. Thus, without loss
of generality, we can assume that (T,+T ) is a commutative monoid.
Theorem 2. If we make the additional assumption that (T,+T ) has the cancellation property, i.e. a+ b =
a+ c implies b = c for all a, b, c ∈ T , then we can construct a (group-)homomorphic multiset hash function
H ′ from Z(A) into a group G that embeds T . Furthermore, this construction has only a constant factor time
and space overhead of 2.
Proof. Since T is a finite, commutative monoid with the cancellation property, there must exist an inverse for
every element, and therefore T is a group. However, to ensure that the inverse can be computed efficiently,
we use the Grothendieck construction in which we represent the positive and negative parts by separate
elements of T .
Let G be the quotient set T × T/≡G, where the equivalence relation ≡G is given by (a+, a−) ≡G
(b+, b−) if, and only if, a+ + b− = a− + b+, for all a+, a−, b+, b− ∈ T . We define the addition operation
[(a+, a−)] +G [(b+, b−)] = [(a+ +T b+, a− +T b−)]. Note that +G respects ≡G, and the inverse is given
by −[(a+, a−)] = [(a−, a+)].
We define the hash function H ′ : Z(A) → G by H ′(M) = [(H(max(M, 0)), H(max(−M, 0)))]. Since
max(−M1, 0)+max(−M2, 0)+max(M1+M2, 0) = max(M1, 0)+max(M2, 0)+max(−(M1+M2), 0)
for all M1,M2 ∈ Z(A), we have H ′(M1 + M2) = [(H(max(M1 + M2, 0)), H(max(−(M1 + M2))))] =
[(H(max(M1, 0)), H(max(−M1, 0)))] + [(H(max(M2, 0)), H(max(−M2, 0)))] = H ′(M1) +H ′(M2).
Finally, we can embed T in G using that map φ(a) = [(a,H(∅))] for all a ∈ T . It follows directly from
the definition of ≡G and +G that φ is an injective homomorphism. Note that the representation size for an
element of G is twice the representation size of an element of T , and H ′ and +G require two invocations of
H and +T , respectively.
9This is by no means a large computational effort even by academic standards. Recent academic lattice reduction records target
lattices of dimension > 800 using BKZ with block size 90 and up [42, 44].
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D Equivalence of incremental multiset hash function definitions
Definition 1 is based on the definition of an incremental multiset hash function given by Clarke et al. [10],
which we restate as follows:
Definition 5. Let Hr : AZ≥0 → T and +rH : T × T → T be probabilistic algorithms using randomness
r ∈ R, where T is a finite set, and let ≡H be an equivalence relation over T . The triple (H,+H,≡H) is a
multiset hash function if it satisfies the following properties:
1. Hr1(M) ≡H Hr2(M), for all M ∈ Z(A), r1, r2 ∈ R;
2. +H respects the equivalence relation ≡H;
3. s1 +r2H s2 ≡H s3 if Hr3(M1) ≡H s1, Hr4(M2) ≡H s2, and Hr1(M1 + M2) = s3 for all M1,M2 ∈
Z(A), s1, s2, s3 ∈ T , r1, r2, r3, r4 ∈ R.
This differs from our definition of a monoid-homomorphic multiset hash function (appendix C) only
in that it allows for randomness in the hash function and in the addition operation +T . Note that this
randomness is for a fixed hash function, and is independent of the randomness in choosing the hash function
from a hash function family. The multiset hash function MSet-Add-Hash [10] relies on this randomness
for security. In fact, though, the randomness is not integral to the hashing operation itself, but rather is used
as a nonce in encrypting the hash code, which we view as an orthogonal operation.10 Therefore, we dispense
with this randomness in our definition.
As explained in appendix C, if we assume that (T,+T ) has the cancellation property, i.e. that +T does
not itself introduce any additional collisions, then a simple construction produces a (group-)homomorphic
multiset hash function from any multiset hash function satisfying definition 5.
10Note also that MSet-Add-Hash is secure as a keyed hash function but not (under the same assumptions) as a public hash
function.
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